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Introduction
[A] man be willing, when others are too, as far forth for peace and defense of
himself ... be contented with so much liberty against other men as he
would allow other men against himself.'
The concept of reciprocity assumes peculiar importance in a world
where there is no external authority to enforce agreements. That is, in a
world that exists in Hobbesian state of nature. Historically, norms of reci-
t Professor of Law and Director, International Business Law Program, George
Mason University School of Law; Co-Director, James M. Buchanan Program in
Economics and the Law.
t! Clerk to Hon. John C. Eldridge, Jr., Court of Appeals of Maryland. The authors
would like to thank Eric Posner and participants at a workshop at George Mason
University School of Law for helpful comments.
1. This is the Second Law of nature, according to Hobbes. THOMAS HoBBEs, LEviA-
THAN 110 (Liberal Arts Press 1958) (1651).
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procity have been vital in escaping lives that would otherwise be "solitary,
poor, nasty, brutish and short."' 2 Reciprocity generally involves returning
like behavior. In Robert Axelrod's terminology, reciprocity is a tit-for-tat
strategy. 3 Such strategy permits cooperation in a state of nature, when no
authority for enforcement of agreements exists.
International law, in this sense, exists in a state of nature, because
there is no overarching legal authority with compulsory jurisdiction to
enforce agreements. Inevitably, reciprocity has become an important ele-
ment in relations between sovereign nations and in the body of existing
international law. This paper begins with setting up a taxonomy of social
interactions, in a game-theoretic framework,4 to examine the role of reci-
procity in the functioning of international law and whether reciprocity is,
in effect, a meta-rule for the law of nations.
Part I defines the characteristics of specific types of interactions
between countries in a game-theoretic framework. Part II sets out defini-
tions for different forms of reciprocity found in international law. This
Article examines the international law settings where reciprocity con-
straints would yield an optimal outcome, and when such constraints would
be ineffective. Part III sets out specific international law examples and
examines where they fit in the taxonomy of the formulated games. This
makes clear that the principle of reciprocity is of vital importance in
achieving efficient outcomes in many circumstances. Finally, Part IV con-
cludes that, despite its occasional failure, reciprocity is important enough
to be considered a meta-rule of the system of international law, and an
essential element in its functioning.
I. Reciprocity through the Lens of Game Theory: A Taxonomy
Game theory is a useful tool for the study of international law and the
relations between sovereign states, because it focuses on interactions where
parties can only determine their own strategies, and thus have no direct
control of the outcome.5 This Article is by no means the first to use game
theory to analyze international law. For instance, Jack Goldsmith and Eric
Posner have used game theory successfully to clarify the often questionable
2. Id. at 107.
3. See ROBERT AXEILROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 20 (1984). Axelrod dem-
onstrates the superiority of a cooperative strategy, when parties undertake repeated
interactions, over a strategy that would seemingly be rational in a Prisoners' Dilemma
situation. For more information, see infra Part I.C.
4. For an earlier, somewhat different version of this taxonomy, see Francesco Par-
isi, The Cost of the Game: A Taxonomy of Social Interactions, 9 EUR. J. L. ECON. 99 (2000)
[hereinafter Parisi, Taxonomy].
5. The general world of game theory is one where a player can control only their
own strategies, but not the final outcome. See, e.g., THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY
OF CONFLICT 122 (1980) (discussing issues of war and strategy and stating that the
"outcome still depends on the [other] player, over whom the first player has no direct
control"). For a very brief and basic introduction to game theory, see ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 34-38 (3d ed. 2000).
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assumptions made about customary law. 6 This Article's goal is similar, in
that it hopes, by using the basic principles of game theory, to clarify the
reasons why reciprocity constraints work.
In game theory, an outcome results from the joint interaction of strate-
gies chosen by independent players. That is, parties can choose their strat-
egies, but their activities alone cannot necessarily determine the outcome.
For the purpose of this analysis, this Article distinguishes five broad catego-
ries of relevant interactions, which provide a useful taxonomy for under-
standing international relations. 7 In each case, the payoff for Player A is
represented by the first number in a cell, and the payoff for Player B by the
second figure. Each player has three possible payoffs. Generally, the
greater the level of cooperation, the greater the combined pay-off. Strategy
I represents full cooperation; Strategy II represents partial cooperation; and
Strategy III represents a situation where neither party cooperates.
Imposing a reciprocity constraint means that the choice of strategy is
determined mutually. Thus, if Player A chooses to cooperate, under a reci-
procity constraint, Player B will have to cooperate. If Player A chooses
Strategy III and does not cooperate, Player B will also choose Strategy III.
Both parties know the imposition of a reciprocity constraint limits interac-
tion, so that only the options on the diagonal, as shown in Figure 2, remain
available.
A. Pure Common-Interest Situations
In game theory, this group of situations are represented as positive sum
games with a single dominant strategy that leads to efficient outcomes.
This optimal outcome is achievable by the parties in a stable Nash equilib-
rium.8 Thomas Schelling has identified this category as a "pure common
interest game."9 As the optimal outcome is a Nash equilibrium-where the
party's incentives are perfectly aligned-any implicit or explicit agreement
between the parties becomes self-enforcing, because no party has an inter-
6. See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary Interna-
tional Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) [hereinafter Goldsmith & Posner, Theory];
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and
Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (2000) [hereinafter Gold-
smith & Posner, Resemblance]. One interesting case they discuss, which is outside this
paper's scope of reciprocity, is the possibility of the use of coercion by a powerful state
to impose rules of international law.
7. Parisi, Taxonomy, supra note 4 (utilizing four of the same categories as discussed
here).
8. A Nash Equilibrium is a situation where no individual player can do better by
changing their strategy, so long as the other party does not change strategy. Thus,
neither party has any incentive to change the choice made. COOTER & ULEN, supra note
5, at 37.
9. SCHELLING, supra note 5, at 88. This "coincidence of interest" can often explain
observed regularities in behavior by states in the context of customary law. Goldsmith
& Posner, Theory, supra note 6, at 1122-23. Thus, what legal theorists would call devia-
tion from customary law are often no more than actions of rational self-interested states
where the underlying interests have changed. In our terminology, this would be when
the pay-offs change so that the states are no longer playing a common-interest game.
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est to unilaterally deviate. A
take the following form:
I
II
III
sample pay-off matrix in such a game could
Figure (1): A Pure Common Interest Game
Both parties following individually rational strategies, which maxi-
mize payoffs, would choose to follow Strategy I for a payoff of 6 units each.
The outcome remains unchanged if a reciprocity constraint is imposed:
III III
I 6, 4,5 2,4
\'
II 5,4 1,2
III 4,2 2, 1 .. 0,0O
Figure (2): A Pure Common Interest Game with Reciprocity
The cooperation outcome, with a payoff of 6 units for each player (Cell
[1,1]), remains the dominant strategy even with the imposition of a reci-
procity constraint. There is no incentive for either party to deviate from
this outcome.
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This amounts to a notion termed in economics literature as the "per-
fect incentive alignment."' 0 This game's payoff structure excludes the pos-
sibility of opportunistic behavior. One could think of this ideal
environment as the result of optimal contract enforcement mechanisms,
institutional safeguards, relationships involving trust and reputation, or
any other device which renders adversarial possibilities non-advantageous
or inaccessible to the players."
Generally speaking, solutions to this class of games are not trouble-
some, since all players gain through cooperation. Perfect incentive align-
ment guarantees the spontaneous equilibrium of the game will occur at an
optimizing point.' 2 Whether existing laws or norms endogenously or
exogenously determine the incentive alignment, no additional intervention
is required.
Real life situations representing common interest games are common.
Nonetheless, they are hard to illustrate with international law examples
because, unlike other strategic situations, common interest situations are
self-enforcing and rarely emerge to attract the attention of international
actors and policymakers as relevant international legal issues. As long as
the interests of all parties converge, no dispute will arise that requires reso-
lution by resort to a treaty or other legal instruments. Nonetheless, situa-
tions do develop that ultimately reflect features of a common interest
game. An example is the custom in international law regarding the Conti-
nental Shelf that developed following the Truman Proclamation of 1945.13
While this is discussed in greater detail below, the lesson is that it was in
the interest of all coastal states to cooperate with the United States in this
10. Parisi, Taxomony, supra note 4, at 104.
11. See generally, COOTER & ULEN, supra note 5 (discussing the interaction of game
theory and the law). They use game theory as an analytical tool to discuss contract law.
Id. at 184-198.
12. Similarly, pure coordination problems are characterized by the perfect conver-
gence of the players' interests, and by the additional feature of multiple equilibria. The
convergence of individual and collective interests fosters an optimal outcome on the
basis of a mere coordination of self-interested strategies. It has been argued, however,
that the solution to coordination problems may be delayed if it relies exclusively on
decentralized processes of legal and social order. The multiplicity of Nash Equilibria in
a coordination game creates difficulties for decentralized solutions. For example, if eve-
ryone in a country needs to coordinate on a basic set of traffic conventions, such as
driving on the same side of the road, the emergence of spontaneous-but heterogene-
ous-clusters of traffic customs would consolidate local equilibria that do not possess
the features of universality required in a modern society. Ironically, however, the most
universal traffic rules are those for water navigation, which emerged through spontane-
ous rule-making processes. For an interesting historical background, see John H. Wig-
more, The Maritime Legal System, in A PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEMS (Vol. III
1928); see generally NICHOLAS J. HEALY & DAVID J. SHARPE, ADMIRALTY CASES AND MATERI-
ALS (2d ed. 1986); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 180-257 (4th
ed. 1990); THOMASJ. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW (1987). For more dis-
cussion on the issue of reciprocity in the Law of the Sea, see infra Part III.C.
13. See infra Part III.A. The discussion is based largely on BROWNLIE, supra note 12,
and MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND THE POWER OF RULES (1999). The incentive
alignment is among the coastal states; in effect, non-coastal states are treated as non-
participants. This is what Goldsmith and Posner would consider a "coincidence of inter-
est." See Goldsmith & Posner, Theory, supra note 6, at 1122-23.
Cornell International Law Journal
matter, even though the Proclamation was inconsistent with existing inter-
national law.
B. Divergent Preference Games
This class of games encompasses positive sum games with multiple Nash
Equilibria. Here, the different equilibria result from differences in prefer-
ences, rather than strategic behavior. These games are characterized by
mixed conflict-coordination motives. These games are often termed "Battle
of the Sexes Games."' 4 Coordination problems in such games could be
solved by permitting sequential decision-making or pre-commitment strate-
gies. In situations where players engage in games repeatedly, a norm of
fairness may sufficiently address the problem of sub-optimal conflictual
outcomes, if the discount rates of the parties are sufficiently small. For a
one-time game, a pay-off matrix for a Divergent Preference game might
look like this:
I II III
Figure (3): Divergent Preference Game
In this case there are three Nash Equilibria along the diagonal, with no
single dominant outcome. Additionally, if the game is played a single time,
a reciprocity constraint would not improve the situation. The pay-off
matrix for a Divergent Preference game with a reciprocity constraint would
take the following form:
14. See Parisi, Taxonomy, supra note 4, at 100.
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III III
/N
7 \
I 3, 1 0,0 0,0
) ,011 0, 0\ 1 0,0
III 0,0 0, 0 \\1, 5
\ /
Figure (4): Divergent Preference Game under Reciprocity
The [i11, i11 cell would yield the highest total payoff, and is most desir-
able for maximizing total welfare. But player A prefers Strategy I and Player
B prefers Strategy Ill. Imposing a reciprocity constraint would not change
this preference ordering. However, it might still be possible to achieve a
result with the highest total outcome. If the game involves repeat players,
or if the possibility of role reversal exists, the players may choose to cooper-
ate to maximize total payoffs in the long term. 15
C. Prisoners' Dilemma Situations
This is probably the best known and most widely used set of games. The
prisoners' dilemma is a game where a surplus is obtainable through mutual
cooperation. However, dominant defection strategies may yield sub-opti-
mal outcomes for both players, which occur when both follow a privately
rational strategy. In such games, defection strategies dominate and the
possibility of opportunistic behavior renders the Pareto optimal outcome
unachievable in equilibrium. A pay-off matrix for a Prisoners' Dilemma
game could have the following form:
15. Role reversibility, where a person can be on either side of a dispute, can lead to
stable norms that yield efficient outcomes over time. This is accomplished by stochastic
reciprocity. See infra Part II. The medieval Law Merchant provides one example. See
Francesco Parisi, Customary Law, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND
THE LAW 572-78 (Peter Newman ed., Vol. I 1988) [hereinafter Parisi, Customary Law]; see
also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (199 1)
(discussing mechanisms of informal dispute settlement, which have evolved among
ranchers in Shasta County, California). In international law, role reversibility is at the
heart of the reciprocity that is integral to the Law of the Sea as it has developed over
time. See generally infra Part III.C.
III
III
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I II III
6,6 ,7 -2,8
7,2- 3,3 -1, 4
Y8 - 4,-1 1ID o
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Figure (5): A Prisoner's Dilemma Problem
Figure 5 depicts the equilibrium obtained in the absence of a reciproc-
ity constraint. The two players are faced with a cooperation problem.
Strategies I, II, and III represent successively lower levels of cooperation.
Even though mutual cooperation at level I generates the highest aggregate
payoff, Strategy III (zero cooperation), dominates in equilibrium, as the
Nash arrows demonstrate for the two players. In this case, cell [I, I] repre-
sents mutual cooperation and is the Pareto-optimal outcome.1 6 Nonethe-
less, cell [III, III], representing mutual defection, is the dominant strategy.
Parisi has pointed out that reciprocity constraints are extraordinarily
well-suited for Prisoners' Dilemma situations. 17 International law provides
plenty of illustrations depicting the power of reciprocity constraints in cor-
recting or preventing Prisoners' Dilemma situations. For example, a reci-
procity constraint, such as that established in Article 21 of the Vienna
Convention of 1969,18 eliminates the possibility of opportunistic behavior,
and makes the Pareto-optimal cooperation outcome feasible.
D. Inessential Games
There are two kinds of games in this category-(i) zero-sum games and (ii)
positive sum games-where all obtainable Nash Equilibria have a constant
aggregate payoff. All these games are characterized by constant pay-offs,
and no single outcome is mutually preferred by both players. A territorial
dispute is an example of this type of game. As it will be discussed more
extensively below, it is impossible to design a reciprocity constraint that
16. A Pareto optimum is achieved when it is no longer possible to make anyone
better off without making at least one person worse off. See generally E. J. MISHAN, INTRO-
DUCTION TO NORMATIVE ECONOMICS 35 (1981).
17. See Parisi, Taxonomy, supra note 4, at 101.
18. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 21, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 337 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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could have any effect on the strategic behavior of the parties. Consider, for
example, the territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.
This is the quintessential zero-sum game, because the territory can go to
only one country. 1 9 The gain to one country equals the loss to the other,
since the territory is available in a fixed amount.20 The winner cannot
compensate the loser; there is no potential gain from mutual cooperation,
and consequently, no role for reciprocity constraints in such a situation.
E. Unilateral Games
A fifth category of situations is termed unilateral games. These games are
characterized by the fact that each player undertakes a dominant strategy,
independently from the other player's actions. These dominant strategies
are different for the two players. In such games, the pay-off matrix may
take the following form:
2
' I II III
1 4,2 , 4 2,6
II 3,1 2,2 1,4
III 2, 0 1, 1 0,3
Figure (6): Unilateral Game Payoff
19. For now, we are ignoring the possibility of Kashmir as an independent country,
so that neither India nor Pakistan claim it. Of course, it is possible to convert this into a
non-zero sum game, by including the costs incurred by each state in maintaining the
conflict into the pay-off matrix. In this particular case, these costs are not insignificant.
India and Pakistan have fought two full scale wars, in 1948 and 1965, over the issue.
There was also a major military encounter in 1999, and have been ongoing skirmishes
for over fifty years. In addition, India claims that Pakistan is funding the ongoing insur-
gency, which India has had to fight. And these are only the direct military costs of the
conflict. For an account of the 1948 and 1965 wars from the Indian perspective, see
JASWANT SINGH, DEFENDING INDIA 155-60, 172-80 (1999) [hereinafter SINGH, DEFENDING
INDIA]. For an Indian journalist's account of the 1999 military encounter, see generally
SRINJOY CHOWDHURY, DESPATCHES FROM KARGIL (2000).
20. Indeed, all situations of conflict over a fixed resource are zero-sum games.
21. This pay-off matrix is inspired by Robert O. Keohane, Reciprocity in International
Relations, 40 INT'L ORG. 1 (1986).
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In this case, Player A will always prefer Strategy I, regardless of Player
B's strategy. An interesting feature of Unilateral Games is that reciprocity
constraints are actually undesirable from the standpoint of maximizing the
total payoff. Remember, with a reciprocity constraint, possible payoffs are
confined to the diagonal. Here, however, the outcome that maximizes
social gain through a maximization of the total payoff is cell [1, III], with a
total payoff of 8. With a reciprocity constraint imposed, the best the play-
ers can do is cell [1, I], with a total payoff of 6. In this case, not imposing a
reciprocity constraint maximizes social welfare. This example is not trivial
or theoretical. As Robert Keohane demonstrates, such behavior is often
found in realm of international trade liberalization. 22 Reciprocity con-
straints can be useful in multilateral trade negotiations, where many of the
parties are not small countries. 23
I II III
I
II
III
4,2 3,4 2, 6
3,1 \1,4
2,0 1,1 \0,3
Figure (7): Unilateral Game Payoff with Reciprocity
F. A Caveat: Absolute versus Relative Payoffs
Many caveats should be kept in mind when determining what kind of
game is at issue. In all the above examples, the pay-off matrices presented
22. See id. at 3 ("reciprocity has been associated with liberal trade policies"). Unilat-
eral trade liberalization can benefit a "small" country by reducing costs to its consumers
and producers, and therefore permitting a more efficient allocation of resources. A
"small" country is one that cannot influence world prices for any good or service by
adjusting its own demand or supply. See generally PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE
OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 191 (5th ed. 2000). Thus, a
small country could benefit by reducing its own barriers of trade, rather than engaging
in import compression. See Nita Ghei & Lant Pritchett, The Three Pessimisms: Real
Exchange Rates and Trade Flows in Developing Countries, in EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGN-
MENT: CONCEPTS AND MEASUREMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 471-80 (Lawrence E.
Hinkle et al. eds. 1999).
23. See infra Part III.B.
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only absolute payoffs, with the assumption that the players used these
absolute payoffs to determine their strategy. In the world of international
law this assumption may be invalid. Players, for example, might use rela-
tive pay-offs to determine their strategies. Consider the pay-off in Figure 1,
a pure common interest game, which leads to a stable Nash equilibrium
which is Pareto optimal, if the players use an absolute pay-off matrix. 24 A
reciprocity constraint would be superfluous. However, where players are
concerned with relative pay-offs, the game is transformed into a negative
sum prisoners' dilemma. 25 The pay-off matrix would take the following
form:
I
II
III
I II III
0, 0 2, 1 4,2
1,-2 -1,-i -3, 0
-4 0, -3 -2-2
Figure (8): Relative Payoff Game
Now, imposing a reciprocity constraint results in an improvement in
welfare, by forcing both players to play Strategy I, with payoff (0, 0).26
However, the players would have reached this outcome without needing a
reciprocity constraint if they were simply considering absolute payoffs.
24. See Figure 1, supra Part L.A.
25. One can think of this as an armament game, where the cost of each weapon to a
player is 1, and the benefit (or cost) of having one more weapon than the other is +2/-2.
26. Thus, there is a credible commitment that ends the armament race.
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III III
0 0 \-2,1 -4,2
II 1,-2 \ 1 ,- -3,0
3\
III 2,-4 0,-3 2
Figure (9): Relative Payoff Game with Reciprocity
Treaties that limit armament growth or experimentation, such as the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), are likely to result in situations
where some states look to relative payoffs when determining their strategy.
However, as discussed below, treaties such as the CTBT are in reality sub-
ject to strategies formed by a complex vector of considerations. It is plausi-
ble that some countries might use a relative pay-off, while others use the
absolute payoff in determining strategy. Further, in such complex treaties,
one can never discount the possibility of genuine differences in presump-
tions, and therefore preferences, among states. Moreover, it is difficult to
characterize a game as either a Prisoners' Dilemma with imperfect monitor-
ing or varying pay-off matrices, a Divergent Preference game, or as a Unilat-
eral game, since the game could have elements of any or all.27
Before turning to actual examples from international law, ranging
from the Vienna Convention of 1969 to the CTBT, which has yet to come
into force, this Article first aims to define the term "reciprocity."
II. Defining Reciprocity
Reciprocity has many definitions in international law literature, including
definitions in choice of law clauses in private international law. 28 This
27. See MICHAEL NICHOLSON, FORMAL THEORIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1989)
(providing a detailed discussion on formal models on technological arms races, id. at
33-38, and the Richardson Arms Race Model, id. at 147-58). Nicholson also develops
formal models for a number of issues in international relations, and discusses them in a
detail that is beyond the scope of this paper. For the original exposition of the Richard-
son arms race model, see generally LEWIS F. RICHARDSON, ARMS AND INSECURITY (1960).
28. International private law is outside the scope of this Article, and is not
addressed. For discussions on choice of law clauses in private international law, see, for
example, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice
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paper follows Parisi's definitions 29 and relates them to Robert Keohane's
definitions of reciprocity.30 While the former set is quite precise and
developed in a game-theoretic framework, Keohane's definitions are widely
used in the literature.
A. Structural Reciprocity
This model assumes an ideal world where the parties' incentives are per-
fectly aligned, such that neither has an incentive to unilaterally defect.
Such reciprocity exists in a world where the players are in a pure common
interest game. 3 1 In these cases there is no need for external enforcement
mechanisms, such as a legal system or a threat of coercion.
When a perfect alignment of interests does not exist, as occurs more
often than not, an incentive for opportunistic behavior arises. If, as is the
case in international law, the mechanisms for contract enforcement are
inadequate or lacking, alternate safeguards will emerge in the system. For
example, over time norms of reciprocity have emerged as meta-rules for
international law in the absence of a recognized rule of law. 32
Evolutionary psychologists have hypothesized that there are behav-
ioral foundations of reciprocity, and that humans have evolved mental
algorithms for identifying and punishing defectors. 3 3 There is a considera-
ble body of literature on experimental economics in this area, as the issue
of reciprocal behavior between individuals has become a matter of increas-
ing interest in experimental economics. As Ernst Fehr and K.M. Schmidt
point out-contrary to predictions based on assumptions of self-interested
utility maximization-a significant body of literature has accumulated evi-
dence suggesting that individuals are motivated by concerns of fairness
and reciprocity. 34
For example, Robert Axelrod found that a tit-for-tat strategy out-
performed a 'rational' self-interested strategy in an iterated game. Specifi-
cally, Axelrod suggests cooperation is far more common and normal than
expected, and the standard economic model of self-interest is not necessa-
of Law and Choice oj Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991); Volker Behr, Enforcement of
United States Money Judgments in Germany, 13 J. L. & Com. 211 (1994).
29. See Parisi, Taxonomy, supra note 4, at 103-10.
30. See Keohane, supra note 21, at 5-8 (defining reciprocity generally).
31. See Schelling, supra note 5, at 84 (terming this concept "the 'pure-collaboration'
game"); see also supra Part I.A.
32. See Parisi, Customary Law, supra note 15. The classic understanding of evolution
of norms outside a formal legal system remains. See, e.g., Ei-LICKSON, supra note 15, at
151-54 (discussing biological selection and norms), 173 (discussing transmission of
norms with welfare maximization).
33. See, e.g., Elisabeth Hoffman et al., Behavioral Foundations of Reciprocity: Experi-
mental Economics and Evolutionary Psychology, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 335 (1998).
34. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence
and Economic Application, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 403, at 1, available at http://
www.CESifo.de (Dec. 2000). However, they also note that standard economics assump-
tions still work in the vast majority of cases in making predictions about behavior.
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence on reciprocity and trust is robust enough that it
cannot be dismissed as an aberration, and must be taken into account while modeling
certain kinds of behavior, such as repeat games.
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rily the best model for all circumstances. 35 Joyce Berg and her co-authors
found reciprocity to be an essential element of human behavior, and held
that this accounted for trust extended to anonymous counterparts. 36
While much of this evidence relates to games with repeat players, Kevin
McCabe and his co-authors find support for cooperation with fully
informed players even in single play experiments. 3 7
Not surprisingly, reciprocity and fairness tend to be meta-rules in cus-
tomary international law. For instance, evidence can be found in ancient
customs of retaliations. 38 Even though practices of literal retaliation are no
longer endorsed as desirable international customs, the principle of reci-
procity remains critical in international law, due to the dominant role
played by customary law among the sources of international law.3 9
B. Induced Reciprocity
This golden rule40 successfully binds each player's strategy to that of his
opponent. Automatic reciprocity of this type creates a symmetric con-
straint for the players' strategies. Thus, when a player chooses to cooper-
ate, he knows the other player will also cooperate. Induced reciprocity
means there is no incentive left for unilateral defection, or defection as a
defensive strategy. 4 1 A reciprocity constraint of this sort eliminates the off-
diagonal choices on the pay-off matrix.
This equilibrium should be contrasted with the outcome induced by a
reciprocity constraint, as illustrated in Figure 3, reproduced below.
Figure 3 shows the effect of a reciprocity constraint on the equilibrium
obtained in Figure 2 under the Prisoners' Dilemma. 42 By eliminating the
accessibility of asymmetric outcomes, golden rule type reciprocity compels
the parties to take into account the effect of the opponent's reciprocal
choice when selecting their optimal strategy. In this way, the dominance of
Strategy III obtained in Figure 2 is transformed into a dominance of Strat-
egy I, with optimal levels of cooperation for the two players. Now, the only
options remaining for the players are mutual cooperation under strategies I
or 1I, or zero cooperation under Strategy III. The players will now choose
the mutual full cooperation outcome as the dominant Strategy-the Nash
equilibrium is also the Pareto-optimal outcome.
This is akin to, though not identical with, what Keohane terms specific
35. See AXELROD, supra note 3, at 27-54.
36. Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity and Social History, 10 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV.
122, 124 (1995).
37. Kevin A. McCabe et al., Game Theory and Reciprocity in Some Extensive Form
Experimental Games, 93 EcON. Sci. 13421, 13428 (1996).
38. Francesco Parisi, The Genesis of Liability in Ancient Law, 3 AM. L. & EcON. REV.
82, 86-91 (2001) [hereinafter Parisi, Genesis of Liability].
39. See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38,
para. 1, 59 Stat. 1033, 1060, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocu-
ments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (stating that customary law is a source of interna-
tional law) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
40. See Parisi, Taxonomy, supra note 4, at 105-08.
41. Defection in this context means choosing Strategy II, and not cooperating.
42. See supra Part I.C.
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Figure (10): A Prisoner's Dilemma Problem with a Reciprocity Constraint
reciprocity, in that it has an equivalence element.4 3 In Keohane's terminol-
ogy, specific reciprocity is bargained for and has fairly precise terms for an
exchange that is approximately equivalent. Though he does not explicitly
make this assumption, specific reciprocity would seem to be more applica-
ble in bilateral situations. 44 A golden-rule type induced reciprocity is eas-
ily applied in a multilateral situation, and it relates to strategy, not to the
content of negotiation. 4 5
A rule of reciprocity that is very close to Keohane's specific reciproc-
ity, and identical with Parisi's induced reciprocity, is recognized as a rule
governing all treaty law within the system of public international law. The
Vienna Convention of 1969 explicitly incorporates such an induced reci-
procity constraint in Article 21(1)(b), which states: "A reservation estab-
lished with regard to another party . . .modifies those provisions to the
same extent for that other party in its relations with the reserving State." 4 6
This provision of the Vienna Convention effectively removes all incen-
tive for unilateral defection and substantially reduces the probability of
hold-outs during treaty negotiations as a desirable strategy. 47
An induced reciprocity rule is sufficient to get the players out of a
prisoners' dilemma. However, induced reciprocity constraints are effective
43. See Koehane, supra note 21, at 8-19.
44. Alan Swan reads specific reciprocity in this bilateral sense. See Alan C. Swan,
"Fairness" and "Reciprocity" in International Trade: Section 301 and the Rule of Law, 16
ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 37, 39-47 (1999).
45. Obviously, sometimes the distinction between negotiating strategy and content
may not be that clear cut.
46. Vienna Convention, supra note 18, at art. 21.
47. The GATT (and now the WTO) has a similar reciprocity constraint through the
use of the 'most-favored-nation' clause. See infra Part III.C.
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only when there is an incentive for unilateral defection by the parties. 48
Such a rule is not a solution when the conflict occurs along the diagonal
possibilities of the game, as in a Divergent Preference game, as it will not
alter the dynamics of the game. A different form of reciprocity constraint
is needed for interactions that take a form other than the Prisoners'
Dilemma.
C. Stochastic Reciprocity
Stochastic reciprocity can be a successful arrangement between two or
more players in a Divergent Preference game. The players must undertake
repeated transactions in a stochastic game. The source of randomness in
the game could be role reversibility of the players, or a random distribution
of asymmetric payoffs to the players over the repeated plays of the game. 49
Stochastic reciprocity requires a pre-commitment by each player to a meta-
strategy for the duration of the game. 5 0 In situations of stochastic reciproc-
ity cooperative strategies are likely to dominate if there is a relatively high
probability of future interaction and a relatively low discount rate of the
players. 5 1 A higher probability of future interaction is more likely to
increase the expected payoff from cooperation; a lower discount rate means
the future payoff is valued relatively highly in present value terms. Thus,
both increase the present value of cooperation.
Stochastic reciprocity is similar to Keohane's 'diffuse reciprocity,'
where an agent cooperates not in expectation of a specific reciprocal
reward, but rather for some general reciprocal return in the futuref52
Either definition matches the environment in international law. The play-
ers are nations who engage in repeated interactions with each other. Thus,
the condition of a high probability of future interaction is satisfied. It is
reasonable to assume that states have low discount rates because, in gen-
eral, nations have long lives and therefore long time horizons.
It is important to keep in mind that while stochastic reciprocity may
solve the problem of divergent preferences in certain cases, it will not solve
the problem of a prisoners' dilemma. If the players were in a prisoners'
dilemma, even in an iterated game, stochastic reciprocity would not change
the usual results obtained in the Chain-Store Paradox and the Folk
48. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter use different terminology. They term reciprocal
tendencies towards cooperation "positive reciprocity," while retaliatory aspects are
called "negative reciprocity." See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Fairness and Retaliation:
The Economics of Reciprocity, CESifo Working Paper No. 336 at 1, available at http://
w-,,.CESifo.de (Mar. 2000). Parisi shows negative reciprocity can also be ex ante effi-
cient. While ex post negative retaliation can be regarded as punitive and destructive in
nature, a credible pre-commitment to negative retaliation can be an effective deterrent
against socially undesirable behavior. See Parisi, Genesis of Liability, supra note 38, at
103.
49. See Parisi, Taxonomy, supra note 4, at 108-09.
50. Parisi terms this "silver-type reciprocity." See id. at 108.
51. Id.
52. See Keohane, supra note 21, at 19-24.
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Theorem. 53
Thus, an induced reciprocity constraint will result in higher levels of
cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma. Stochastic reciprocity will encourage
cooperation in a situation where the players have divergent preferences.
Structural reciprocity exists when players' interests are perfectly aligned
and there is no need to impose any additional conditions, as the players
will choose to cooperate in any case. Reciprocity constraints are ineffec-
tive, and might even have adverse effects, in inessential games where the
aggregate payoff is constant; or in the case of a unilateral game, where a
player has a dominant strategy regardless of other player's strategy.
III. Reciprocity Constraints in Public International Law
This section considers some examples from international law, and exam-
ines the role of reciprocity constraints in each. Reciprocity has powerful
implications for many important domains in international law. First, this
Article examines the Truman Proclamation as an example of a pure com-
mon interest game, which required no external reciprocity constraint. The
custom that developed following the Truman Proclamation could be con-
sidered an example of structural reciprocity. Second, this Article considers
the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the United States'
use of Section 301 of its Trade Act of 197454 as a tool to obtain reciprocal
trade liberalization. The GATT regime is one of induced reciprocity, with
some exceptions for developing countries and regional trading blocs. The
United States has often used the threat of unilateral sanctions under Sec-
tion 301 to obtain trade liberalization measures from its partners-liberali-
zation that the partner was in fact obligated to undertake under GATT.
Third, this Article considers the case of the Law of the Sea as an example of
stochastic reciprocity. Lastly, this Article considers the complex case of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Depending on the players
included, this is treated as a different game: a Prisoners' Dilemma with
53. The so-called Chain-Store Paradox was first pointed out in, Reinhard Selten, The
Chain Store Paradox, in THEORY AND DECISION 127, 127-29 (1978) (describing the para-
dox). The paradox points out that in a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma game with a finite
horizon, mutual defection is likely to dominate the game from the very first round of
players' interaction. The result is logically derived through backward induction: since
the last game is likely to be dominated by mutual defection, the one-to-the-last game will
also induce defection (since there is no future cooperation to preserve). The same logic
thus applies to all previous rounds of the game, all the way up to the first round. The so-
called Folk Theorem, instead suggests that in the case of infinitely repeated games, coop-
eration may (but will not necessarily) exist. Without a last period game, the backward
induction logic of the Chain-Store Paradox cannot be applied. The Folk Theorem tells us
that in an infinitely repeated game, any pattern of behavior can be observed over a finite
number of periods. The Folk Theorem has no paternity (hence, the name of the theo-
rem, as part of the "folk wisdom" of game-theory). Contributions and mathematical
elaborations of this theorem however include, Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The
Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981).
For an accessible presentation of these concepts, see ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFOR-
MATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 121- 25 (2d ed. 1989).
54. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994) .
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monitoring problems; a state considering relative pay-offs; a divergent pref-
erence game; or a unilateral game. Not surprisingly, the reciprocity con-
straint in the treaty provides insufficient incentive for many of the key
states to ratify, or even sign, the CTBT.
A. Structural Reciprocity: The Truman Proclamation
The Truman Proclamation is an illustration of a pure common interest
game with structural reciprocity.5 5 In 1945, President Harry Truman
issued a Proclamation with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Seabed of the Continental Shelf, which stated: "[T]he government of
the United States regards the natural resources of the subsoil and the sea-
bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States, subject to
its jurisdiction and control."'5 6
At the time this claim was made, it was not only novel, but "inconsis-
tent with pre-existing international law," since "[n]o state had ever made a
general claim to control over all of the seabed resources of its continental
shelf beyond twelve nautical miles." 57 Nonetheless, other states quickly
followed the lead of the United States and made similar claims regarding
their own continental shelves. 58 Within a few years the claim assumed the
form of a custom, which is a primary source of international law. By 1951
the International Law Commission included the right of coastal states over
their continental shelves in a set of Draft Articles. 59 By 1958, the codifica-
tion in the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf confirmed the
claim's customary status. 6 ° Thus, it took less than fifteen years for this
claim to ripen into custom.
In our framework, the explanation is quite straightforward. The claim
by the United States concerned its continental shelf. It did not preclude
other coastal states from making the same claim. In fact, it allowed other
coastal states to make similar claims with respect to their own continental
shelves. 6 1 Further, as the claim did not require actual occupation or pre-
scriptive use, all other coastal states could make the claim, without regard
to the amount of their resources or strength. All coastal states stood to
gain from making the claim, and no state lost anything because the United
States made the claim. Thus, there was no reason for any coastal state to
object to the United States' initial claim. In this case, the incentives of all
coastal states were perfectly aligned, as in a pure common interest game,
55. For an analysis of the Truman Proclamation in terms of reciprocity, see also
BYERS, supra note 13, at 90-92; BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 214-17, 219.
56. Reproduced in 40 AM.J. INT'L L. Supp. 45, 46 (1946); see also BYERS, supra note 13,
at 91.
57. See BYERS, supra note 13, at 91.
58. These included Mexico, Argentina, Brazil and Australia, among others. Id. at 91
n.18.
59. Draft Articles on the Continental Shelf and Related Subjects, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 123, 141 (1957).
60. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
61. See BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 215.
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described in Section II above. There was no need for an external enforce-
ment mechanism because the alignment of the parties' incentives was suffi-
cient to transform the Truman Proclamation into binding custom.
6 2
B. Induced Reciprocity: The GATT and the U.S. use of Section 301
Article 21(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention is the prime example of induced
reciprocity, and thereby, also a meta-rule for treaty law. Titled, "Legal
Effects of Reservations and of Objections to Reservations," it reads: "[a]
reservation established with regard to another party ...modifies those
provisions to the same extent for that other party in its relations with the
reserving State." A variant of induced reciprocity is found in GATT in the
form of the most-favored nation (MFN) 63 and national treatment clauses. 64
This counters the fact that trade liberalization often takes the form of a
Prisoners' Dilemma. 65
For economists, the welfare and efficiency gains from free trade are
clear, particularly in a full employment model. The analysis of free trade
gains date back to Adam Smith 6 6 and David Ricardo. 6 7 A country special-
izes in goods it has a comparative advantage in, and trades these goods
with other countries. In the basic model, gains from specialization make
international trade a positive-sum game, and free trade is a Kaldor-Hicks
welfare gain.68
62. In the parlance of Goldsmith and Posner, the rule of customary law that emerged
would be no more than a "coincidence of interest." See Goldsmith & Posner, Theory,
supra note 6, at 1122. It is worth keeping in mind that Goldsmith and Posner are ques-
tioning theories of international law, rather than basing custom on some sense of exoge-
nous obligation by the states. From our perspective, coincidence of interest, that is, a
pure common interest game, can result in a rule of customary law. We make no claims
with respect to the stability of the rule that emerges. In fact, our analysis is perfectly
consistent with that of Goldsmith and Posner, who argue that the behavioral regularity
will disappear if the interests of the nations change. Id.
63. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1, para. 1, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. (stating in part: "any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like prod-
uct originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.").
64. Id. art. Ill, para. 2 (stating: "Itjhe products of the territory of any contracting
party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject,
directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess to
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.").
65. Sometimes trade liberalization can take the form of a unilateral game. See, e.g.,
Keohane, supra note 21, at 13-15 (discussing why it was optimal for Great Britain to
reduce its tariff levels, regardless of France's treatment of its own tariffs).
66. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., 1976).
67. See DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION (1963).
68. The models that explain gains from specialization and international trade are
well-known and widely available. Therefore, a detailed explanation is not provided here.
A simple exposition of the basic models of international trade based on the notions of
absolute advantage (from Smith), comparative advantage (from Ricardo), and specific
factors (also known as the Hecksher-Ohlin model) that remain the basis of much of the
analysis of international trade can be found in, KRUGMAN & OBSTFELD, supra note 22, at
66 - 85. A Kaldor-Hicks gain is obtained by a move where the winners can compensate
the losers. See generally MISHAN, supra note 16, at 303-04.
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However, there are political and social costs to trade liberalization.
Import-competing industries lose as a result of trade liberalization. These
groups will lobby the government against trade liberalization. 69 Further, if
one state lowers trade barriers, and the other state does not, the liberaliz-
ing state stands to lose politically. In any case, mercantilist sentiment is
alive and well-in most states, and the incentive to unilaterally defect-that
is, maintain trade barriers-is always strong. Thus, trade liberalization
begins to take the form of a Prisoners' Dilemma. Both parties would be
better off under a free trade regime, but each has a dominant strategy that
results in maintaining trade barriers.
The MFN and national treatment clauses, though not in line with Keo-
hane's definition of reciprocity 70 or Swan's interpretation of Keohane's def-
inition, 71 nonetheless, fits Parisi's definition of induced reciprocity.
Swan's definition of reciprocity requires Country A to extend the same
treatment to imports from Country B that Country B extends to its imports
from Country A. This is specific reciprocity as Keohane defines it. How-
ever, Swan's concern is more mirage than reality. The MFN clause
72
requires each nation to treat imports of goods, services and capital from all
countries equally. The national treatment clause7 3 requires imports of
goods, services and capital receive the same treatment as those of national
origin. 74 These clauses, coupled with the multilateral nature of GATT, are
sufficient to create an induced reciprocity constraint that will provide an
incentive to countries to liberalize trade regimes, since all signatories
reduce trade barriers equally with respect to all parties. In effect, the MFN
clause will yield reciprocity of the sort that Swan defines, but through a
route of multilateral obligations.
By creating a regime of induced reciprocity GATT eliminates the
"sucker's payoff' in the Prisoners' Dilemma. 75 That is, it makes sure a
state will not find itself in a position where it has lowered its trade barriers,
69. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (discussing the workings of interest groups). According to
Olson, a small cohesive group faces lower organization costs and can lobby more effec-
tively. Id. at 53-65. Further, if costs are concentrated in a small group, while benefits
are dispersed over a large group, such that the average loss is greater that the average
gain (but total gain is greater than total loss), the small group could effectively lobby to
prevent the action that would benefit the large group. Id. Thus, in terms of trade liberal-
ization, costs are borne by the import-competing industries, while gains are dispersed
over all consumers. The average cost to each producer is greater than the average benefit
to each consumer. But total gains are greater than total losses, as consumers vastly out-
number producers. Nonetheless, the producers could effectively lobby to maintain trade
barriers. Id.
70. See Keohane, supra note 21, at 5-8.
71. See Swan, supra note 44, at 42-43.
72. GATT, supra note 63, art. 1.
73. Id. art. II.
74. There are exceptions to this rule for developing countries, regional trading blocs,
and free trade zones. See id. art. XXIV (discussing customs unions and free trade zones),
art. XXXVI (discussing developing countries).
75. The "sucker" is the player who cooperates while the other player defects. In
terms of Figure 2, supra Part I, this would be Player A choosing Strategy I and Player B
choosing Strategy Ill. Player A will then receive a payoff of -2, while Player B gets 8. That
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but its trading partners have not. However, in the real world, this may not
be sufficient to get players to the Pareto optimal outcome of free trade.
First, the reciprocity constraint does not change the incentive of the
import-competing groups to seek protection; public choice dynamics in
this aspect remain unchanged. However, the reciprocity constraint does
provide a counter balance, and the possibility of access to world markets
through GATT provides an incentive for exporters to lobby legislators
against protection.
Second, induced reciprocity is not perfect since GATT permits excep-
tions, particularly for developing countries. Specifically, GATT permits
them to maintain higher tariff barriers for longer periods of time. The
exceptions are interesting, because they make the induced reciprocity con-
straint imperfect. Thus, for the efficient outcome to occur a collateral sanc-
tion may have to be provided. Swan suggests that threat of unilateral
action by the United States, under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, 76
provided a collateral sanction that furthered trade liberalization goals. 77
Under Section 301, the President of the United States can impose tariffs
and other trade sanctions unilaterally on imports of a country he had
determined had committed any one of several transgressions, which
restricted access of U.S. goods and was "unjustifiable" 78 or "unreasona-
ble."'79 Swan claims that much of the United States' use of Section 301,
which has been denounced by other countries as unilateral action,
occurred where the sanctioned state had failed to abide by its obligations
and lower its trade barriers.8 0 Swan looks at forty-three instances where
Section 301 cases were submitted for international dispute resolution
between August 1988 and June 1998.81 Of these, thirty-one cases had out-
comes favorable to the United States, with two outcomes unfavorable, four
incomplete, and six that could not be classified. 82 In virtually all instances
the American position rested on either or both of the following charges: the
named foreign country had violated the terms of, or denied the benefits
under, WTO (GATT) or other international agreement (terms that found
their ultimate justification in a trade liberalization philosophy); or, the for-
eign country maintained unreasonably restrictive access to its economy
against American and other foreign nations.8 3 Both charges support freer
trade. Thus, according to Swan, the use of Section 301 advanced global
trade liberalization. 84
is, Player A is the sucker. An induced reciprocity constraint of the form imposed by the
MFN clause eliminates this possibility.
76. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1994).
77. See Swan, supra note 44, at 37.
78. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1994).
79. Id. § 2411(b)(1).
80. See Swan, supra note 44, at 39.
81. Id. at 58-67.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Collateral sanctions act to balance domestic interest groups in favor of
protection. Arguably, only a big country could have the power to use such
a sanction effectively, since access to its markets (the reciprocal condition)
is a valued resource. Nonetheless, the potential for abuse is obvious. Swan
makes no claim that the United States has not engaged in trade protection
in its own right.85 The most encouraging aspect of the entire regime is
that, despite these imperfections, the successive rounds of GATT, and now
the WTO, have succeeded in lowering global average tariff rates. Even the
imperfect induced reciprocity of the GATT regime has assisted the global
move toward trade liberalization, without relapses into tariff wars.
C. Stochastic Reciprocity: The Law of the Sea
Customary law, as discussed earlier, typically provides the best examples
of stochastic reciprocity.8 6 The Law of the Sea offers a striking example of
custom in international law, even though the International Law Commis-
sion has codified much of the customary law. 8 7 We consider two exam-
ples: the right of innocent passage and the right of hot pursuit.88
All states currently exercise some degree of sovereignty over a belt of
sea adjacent to their coast-lines comprising the "territorial sea" of their
nation.8 9 However, customary law gives foreign vessels the right of inno-
cent passage through territorial sea. 90 The Law of the Sea Convention
states: "[plassage is innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace,
85. One of the more troubling facets of protectionist sentiment is the attempts to
redefine reciprocity to trade balance with each trading partner. Such a definition clearly
will not assist in getting nations out of the Prisoners' Dilemma of trade liberalization.
86. The medieval Law Merchant (Lex Mercatoria) also provides an example of
stochastic reciprocity, based on the possibility of role reversibility of the parties. During
medieval times, the body of law that eventually came to be known as the Law Merchant
evolved as a response to the need of traveling merchants for a set of meta-rules that
would govern their interactions in commerce with each other. The merchants acted as
both buyers and sellers at this point in time, since the main form of business under-
taken was a form of arbitrage. Merchants traveled from one town to another in order to
exploit price differentials between the markets in the various towns. The merchants
needed rules that would apply to their business transactions, as a means of increasing
certainty in their transactions. The result was the Law Merchant, a body of private law
that applied uniformly to commercial contracts entered into by professional merchants.
The merchants had a strong incentive to create laws that were 'fair,' in that they favored
neither the buyer nor the seller in any systematic manner, since each merchant could be
either a buyer or a seller in any given transaction. Of course, in the case of the Law
Merchant, there was also a reputational cost to opportunistic behavior which violated
the norm of reciprocity and provided a collateral sanction for such behavior. See Parisi,
Customary Law, supra note 15, at 574 - 76.
87. See BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 180-257; see also KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN
PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW 29-40, 139-41 (2d ed. 1993).
88. For a discussion of other rules of customary law with respect to the Law of the
Sea, which were not necessarily respected over time, see Goldsmith & Posner, Resem-
blance, supra note 6, at 647-54 (discussing evidence suggesting certain rules of custom-
ary international law are not followed during times of war).
89. BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 180.
90. Id. at 194-95.
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good order or security of the coastal State."9 1 An earlier declaration held:
"[slubject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether
coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territo-
rial sea."'9 2 Brownlie considers the codification in the Conventions to cor-
respond to customary law.93
Similarly, the Convention on the High Seas codifies customary law.94
Consider one example-the right of hot pursuit. According the Convention
on the High Seas:
The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken when the competent
authorities of the coastal State have good reason to believe that the ship has
violated the laws and regulations of that State. Such pursuit must be com-
menced when the foreign ship . .. is within . . . the territorial sea or the
contiguous zone of the pursuing State, and may only be continued outside
the territorial sea or the contiguous zone if the pursuit has not been
interrupted....
The right of hot pursuit ceases as soon as the ship pursued enters the territo-
rial sea of its own country or of a third state.9 5
These rules apply to all countries impartially. When it comes to either
innocent passage, or the right of hot pursuit, a state can be on either side of
the transaction. That is, the state could be the one exercising sovereignty
over the territorial sea, or it could be the state represented by the flag on
the ship. Thus, the state can both seek innocent passage through another's
state's territorial sea, and provide innocent passage. Similarly, the state
could engage in hot pursuit, or be the state of the flag on the ship being
pursued. Further, the right of hot pursuit ceases at another state's territo-
rial sea. While this prevents continued pursuit, it also prevents other states
from encroaching on other nation's territorial sea under the justification of
hot pursuit.
The Law of the Sea seems to have the two essential elements for a
successful stochastic reciprocity condition-role reversibility and repeat
interactions. 96 Each State can be on either end of the transaction and
undertakes similar transactions repeatedly. Thus, any attempt to cheat
today is likely to rebound tomorrow when the State finds itself on the other
side of the transaction. For example, if State A limits innocent passage
through its territorial sea, other states are then likely to limit innocent pas-
sage to ships flying State A's flag. This role reversibility is why all nations
respect the customs that have developed into binding legal practice. Simi-
larly, role reversibility, in a multi-period game, also provides a sufficient
incentive against systematically biasing the laws in favor of any one out-
91. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 19, para. 1, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397, 404.
92. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art.
4, para. 1, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 214.
93. BROWNLIE, supra note 12, at 195.
94. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 94.
95. Id. art. 23, paras. 1-2.
96. See supra Part II.C.
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come. Thus, the element of role reversibility is akin to Rawls's "veil of igno-
rance. '"" Just as a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance" yields an outcome where
the parties refrain from opportunistic behavior, role reversibility in a
repeated game will yield fair laws, in so far as they do not contain systemic
biases.
D. When Reciprocity Fails: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
After two years of often contentious negotiations, the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly adopted the CTBT, on September 10, 1996.98 The treaty
prohibits members from performing any nuclear weapons testing, or
allowing any nuclear explosion to occur in their jurisdiction.9 9 These obli-
gations are absolute. The CTBT is not subject to reservations.10 0 Addi-
tionally, the CTBT sets forth a verification regime under Article IV, and
compliance measures under Article V.101 On September 24, 1996, over
fifty countries, including the United States, Great Britain, France, China
and Russia, signed the CTBT. The signature and ratification of at least
forty-four countries is required for the CTBT to go into force.' 0 2 However,
as of March 30, 2002, India and Pakistan have not signed the CTBT. More-
over, the United States, China and Russia have not ratified the CTBT. Rati-
fication by these five nations, as well as eight others, is required for the
CTBT to go into force.' 0 3
The CTBT has a built in reciprocity condition, in that all members
undertake a reciprocal obligation to end nuclear testing. Typical disarma-
ment treaties can be treated as Prisoners' Dilemmas, with the additional
problem of monitoring. 10 4 If the monitoring problem can be solved, a reci-
97. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971). Rawls begins with postulating
what he calls the original position, where all persons are equal. Id. at 11. Then imagine
that all persons choose together, in a single act, all the principles which are to assign
basic rights and duties, and to determine the division of social benefits. Id. However,
this determination is made behind "the veil of ignorance," before any person knows their
true position in society. Id. at 12. According to Rawls, the principles that will emerge
will be just, based on a notion of "justice as fairness." Id. Since no-one knows what
their position will be, there is no incentive to choose an assignment that favors any
particular group. In the sense that the principles chosen will be fair, the social order that
emerges will be just. Id.
98. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439.
99. Id. art. 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1444.
100. Id. art. VII, 35 I.L.M. at 1455.
101. Id. art. IV, 35 I.L.M. at 1449-55 (outlining verification); id. art. V, 35 I.L.M.
1455 (outlining compliance measures).
102. See id. Annex 1, 35 I.L.M. at 1458 (listing participating countries); id. Annex 2,
35 I.L.M. at 1458 (listing whose ratification is essential to the CTBT).
103. The following countries have not ratified the CTBT: Algeria, China, Colombia,
North Korea, Congo, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, the United States,
and Vietnam. Of these, North Korea, India, and Pakistan have not signed the CTBT. See
Status of Signature and Ratification, at http://www.ctbto.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2003).
Ratification by all these countries is required under CTBT. See CTBT, supra note 98, art.
XIV.
104. See NICHOLSON, supra note 27, at 93-98. William Aceves took this approach by
analyzing the CTBT in an institutionalist framework. See William J. Aceves, Institutional-
ist Theory and International Legal Scholarship, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 227 (1997).
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procity constraint, which creates induced reciprocity, should suffice for
achieving cooperation.1 0 5 However, the reciprocity constraint has been
insufficient for some states to sign the CTBT. Both India and Pakistan have
refused to sign the CTBT. t0 6 The United States Senate has refused to ratify
the CTBT. European nations, on the other hand, have embraced the CTBT,
and most have ratified it. These different responses can largely be
explained by examining the nations' different perspectives. In effect, the
participants are playing different games. For those nations which have rat-
ified the CTBT, it reflects the solution to a prisoners' dilemma based on
relative payoffs. For those nations which have either not signed or ratified
the CTBT, it could be a matter of divergent preferences, or a unilateral
game based on absolute payoffs.
The CTBT is not a typical disarmament treaty. First, there are two
classes of states: those with nuclear weapons, and those without. This con-
sideration is important when examining the strategies of nations; nations
considering absolute payoffs versus nations looking at relative payoffs.
Second, the disarmament element attaches the problem of monitoring.
The different reactions of the states can be viewed along these lines.
The European states, and possibly nations in Latin America and
Africa, could be considered as nations looking at relative pay-offs. The
non-nuclear states in Western Europe are protected under NATO, while the
others face no immediate threat of nuclear war. For these states, the reci-
procity constraint is sufficient to induce their signature. The United States
can be considered a nation in a Prisoners' Dilemma with a monitoring
problem. There is some evidence, from official statements, that a major
concern of the United States in ratifying the CTBT are the problems of
monitoring and compliance.
The truly interesting case is that of India. As India has evolved it has
persistently objected to the CTBT and refused to sign it. Jaswant Singh said
the CTBT imposed a regime of "nuclear apartheid."' 1 7 In fact, India is
looking at absolute pay-offs when making its decision. In this case, the
pay-off has to take into account the nuclear arsenals of both Pakistan and
China;' 08 both states currently occupy territory that India claims. These
concerns were made clear in the Official Response of India to the June 12
This view fails to recognize the peculiar nature of the CTBT, in that the reciprocity con-
straint applies only to relative pay-offs, and thus maintains two classes of states: those
with nuclear weapons and those without such weapons.
105. See NICHOLSON, supra note 27, at 98.
106. India, which has persistently objected to the CTBT in its current form, was an
original proponent of the CTBT in the 1950s, under its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal
Nehru. See Jaswant Singh, Against Nuclear Apartheid, FOREIGN AFF., Sept. - Oct. 1998, at
41-42 [hereinafter Singh, Apartheid].
107. See id. at 48. While the article cited expressed his personal views, it is worth
mentioning that Singh, at the time of writing of this paper, was a cabinet member in the
current Indian government. Id. at 41.
108. India and Pakistan are long term military rivals, and have fought three full-scale
wars in 1948, 1965, and 1971. See SINGH, DEFENDING INDIA, supra note 19, at 155-60,
172-95. China invaded India in 1962. Id. at 160-72.
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Communique by the "Group of Eight" Countries. 10 9 China, in particular,
has a nuclear arsenal that is much larger than India's. As long as India is
looking at absolute pay-offs, the reciprocity constraint of the CTBT will be
insufficient to allay India's concerns about its national security, since the
CTBT eliminates relative, not absolute, discrepancies in nuclear power.
From India's perspective, one of relative payoffs, the CTBT is a unilateral
game. Thus, the reciprocity constraint will be insufficient to induce India's
cooperation.
The other interesting aspect of the CTBT was the global response to
India's nuclear tests in 1998.' 10 India is not a signatory to the CTBT and
could even qualify as a persistent objector. Even though India had not vio-
lated any treaty obligations, the Indian nuclear tests resulted in a chorus of
condemnation, exemplified by the June 12 Communique of the "Group of
Eight.""' The statements at the 2000 meeting of the Preparatory Commis-
sion of the CTBT Organization, which met at the third anniversary of its
establishment, suggest an answer: the CTBT has perhaps established a
global norm against nuclear testing, even though it was not in force. 1 12
However, if such a norm had been established in the absence of reciprocity,
it has to be in the nature of jus cogens, a peremptory norm, which over-rode
India's objections. This seems implausible in view of the fact that such
important players, like the United States and China, have failed to ratify the
CTBT. 113
Even though a reciprocity constraint was not sufficient to achieve
cooperation in the case of the CTBT, different forms of reciprocity play a
critical role in international law. Reciprocity can be structural or primary,
as was the case in the Truman Proclamation. In such cases, there is no
need for an external enforcement mechanism. Reciprocity can be induced,
that is imposed externally, as in the GATT regime. Reciprocity can be
treated as an obligatory condition, where the sense of obligatoriness is
internal, as was the case of the Law of the Sea. Reciprocity emerges as a
key element in many interactions between states.
109. Press Release, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi External Publicity Divi-
sion, Statement by Official Spokesperson of the Government of India in Response to the
June 12 Communique by the "Group of Eight" Countries, June 13, 1998, at http://
www.clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/indiaO6l3.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003); see also
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Site: Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, G8 Foreign
Ministers Communique on Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests, June 12, 1998, at http://
clw.org/pub/clw/coalition/g80612.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003) [hereinafter G8June
12 Communique].
110. Pakistan conducted nuclear test shortly afterwards.
111. See G8 June 12 Communique, supra note 109.
112. Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treat Organization
(CTBTO) Provisional Technical Secretariat, Summary Report of Panel Discussion: CTBT
Three Years On - Significance, Achievements, The Way Forward, Apr. 4, 2000, at http://
www.clw.org/coalition/ctbto04O400.htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Panel
Report). The Panel called the CTBT the "second pillar of the non-proliferation regime."
See id. '1 9.
113. For a list of countries that still have to ratify, see supra note 103.
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IV. Reciprocity as a Meta-Rule for the System
To repeat the obvious, there is no overarching legal authority governing the
law of nations. Why then do nations generally follow this law?' 14 There is
war, indisputably, but war and raw power are not what determine the vast
majority of dealings between nations. Cooperation and peaceful resolution
of disputes are what one generally observes."l 5 From the discussion in
Parts II and Ill, it is clear that reciprocity is an important element in deal-
ings between states. Is it possible to claim that reciprocity is a meta-rule
for international law?' 16
The normative case for reciprocity is relatively easy to make. Nation-
states can be regarded as repeat players that accumulate institutional
knowledge, a reputation, and presumably trust over time. International law
can be regarded as an iterated game, played by these repeat players, with
low discount rates. Cooperation fostered by reciprocity is likely to yield
higher return outcomes for these players than a strategy of conflict.' 17
We can make a positive case for reciprocity as well. A considerable
body of evidence suggests that scholars, and states, accept reciprocity as a
basic rule of international law. Start by considering the limits of authorita-
tive sources of international law. According to the International Court of
Justice, there are four sources:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.118
In effect, the three major sources are treaties, custom and general prin-
ciples of law. Treaty law is subject to reciprocity, under Article 21(b) of the
Vienna Convention. Before turning to custom, let us consider the case of
the general principles. Some of these were laid out in the Draft Declaration
on the Rights and Duties of States of the International Law Commission.
The theme of reciprocal recognition runs strongly through the Declara-
tions. Consider Articles 2, 3, and 5, respectively:
114. See generally Jianming Shen, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations
Observe, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 287 (1999).
115. See id. at 289.
116. The discussion here is not about the validity of international law, or the source
of international law. Thus, there is no discussion of the natural law school or the posi-
tivist school. The sole issue addressed is whether the notion of reciprocity is a basic rule
of the system. For an excellent discussion of the historical development, see id. at
290-325. Shen reaches the conclusion that international law is ultimately the expres-
sion of the "compromised wills" of sovereign states, which is why they comply with the
law more often than not. Id. at 354-55.
117. That is, in situations akin to the Prisoners' Dilemma or Divergent Preferences,
reciprocity constraints can be designed to foster cooperation.
118. ICJ Statute, supra note 39, art. 38, para. 1.
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Article 2. Every State has the right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory
and over all persons and things therein, subject to the immunities recognized
by international law.
Article 3. Every State has the duty to refrain from intervention in the internal
or external affairs of any other State.
Article 5. Every State has the right to equality in law with every other
State. 119
These rights and duties are clearly reciprocal, even though the word
itself never appears in the Declaration. Article 12 of the Declaration states
that every state has the right to self-defense. 120 The reciprocity in this
right is obvious; war, as Theodor Meron points out, is "paradigmatically
interstate law, driven by reciprocity .. 121
Michael Byers holds that the principle of reciprocity is fundamental to
the system of international law. 122 International law itself emerges from a
complex of bilateral relationships based on the consent of states. Reciproc-
ity is a fundamental aspect of bilateralism, since bilateral relationships
inevitably involve some element of quid pro quo. 123 However, bilateral rela-
tionships make up a general rule, which is given added weight by custom-
ary practice. As rules are generalized, reciprocity is important as a
background rule in view of the legal equality of states. In the context of
customary international law, any state claiming a right has to accord the
same right to all other states.12 4 Thus, reciprocity is needed to maintain
the generalized principle of sovereignty. Therefore, Byers treats reciprocity
as a separate principle of international law.12 5
Jianming Shen also considers reciprocity a basic principle of interna-
tional law, but uses a different framework.126 According to Shen, consent
alone is an insufficient basis for international law. Instead, international
law is the compromised expression of the will of states, with gains and
concessions taken into account. 1 27 However, reciprocity remains an essen-
tial element in maintaining this compromise.
Reciprocity as a fundamental concept underlying international law
appears over and over again, particularly in the context of customary law.
Customary law is typically subject to reciprocity constraints, as demon-
strated by the Law of the Sea.' 2 8 Karol Wolfe points out that customary
119. Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, May 12, 1949 of the Inter-
national Law Commission, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/declar.htm
[hereinafter Draft Declaration].
120. Id. art. 12 ("[Elvery State has the right of individual or collective self-defense
against armed attack.").
121. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 Am. J. INT'L L. 239,
243 (2000).
122. See BYERS, supra note 13, at 88-89 ("reciprocity may be fundamental to
bilateralism").
123. See id. at 89.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 90.
126. See Shen, supra note 114.
127. Id. at 354-55.
128. See supra Part III.C.
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law remains a important source of legally binding practice in international
law. 129 While treaties are an expensive and difficult way to create rules,
custom remains more flexible. 130 In virtually all cases where custom can
be identified, the reciprocal nature of the practice is clear. As the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) said: "[an] essential requirement for the prac-
tice of States to acquire the status of customary law is that such State
practice must be common, consistent and concordant."' 3'
Conventions grow into custom and then are applied on a reciprocal
basis, as was the case in the Nuremberg trials following World War II. At
that point, the issue arose whether aggressive war had been illegal and
criminal under international law prior to 1945.132 The "Counsel for the
defendants claimed that the principles laid down in the four-power London
agreement" were treaty law, to which Germany was not a signatory. 133 The
tribunal reasoned that wars of aggression were illegal under customary
international law, citing the Kellog-Briand Pact,' 34 to which Germany was
a signatory, and further ruled the Hague conventions had grown into cus-
tomary law.' 35 Thus, the law could be applied on a reciprocal basis to
Germany. 136
Violations of norms of reciprocity can be considered violations of the
law. Unilateral defections from a norm are viewed with disapprobation,
and typically have at least reputational consequences. In the modern con-
text, the defecting state can sometimes be subject to sanctions that exceed
more than mere disapprobation. For instance, if a state has chosen to sub-
mit itself to ICJ jurisdiction, it can be haled before the ICJ. Of course, the
matter of ICJ jurisdiction itself has an element of reciprocity.
Consider the case of United States v. Nicaragua. ' 3 7 Both countries had
declarations subjecting them to the jurisdiction of the ICJ. 1 38 On April 6,
1984, hearing that Nicaragua was going to bring suit, the United States
deposited a declaration with the United Nations purporting to exclude
United States acceptance to ICJ jurisdiction over any dispute with a Central
American state for two years. It did this despite its 1946 Declaration,
which contained no such reservation, and was expressed to be terminable
only upon six months notice.t 3 9 The United States based its claim on a
129. See \VOLFKE, supra note 87.
130. Id. at xiv.
131. The Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G. v. Ice.), 1974 I.CJ. 175, 222 (July 25).
132. See Oscar Schacter, In Defense of International Rules on Use of Force, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 113, 114-15 (1986).
133. See id. at 115.
134. Kellog-Briand Pact (General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of
National Policy), Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, T.S. No 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
135. Schacter, supra note 132, at 115.
136. Id. at 115-16.
137. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 L.CJ. Rep. 392 (Nov. 26).
138. See Herbert W. Briggs, Nicaragua v. United States: Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
79 AM. J. INT'L L. 373, 376-78 (1985).
139. Id. at 377; see Anthony D'Amato, Comment, Modifying U.S. Acceptance of the
Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 AM. J. INTl L. 389 n.lO (1985).
Cornell International Law Journal
reading of reciprocity of Nicaragua's declaration that contained no notice
provision. That meant, the United States argued, that Nicaragua could ter-
minate at will, and therefore the United States' obligation could not be held
to be any greater. 140 By a vote of 15 to 1, the ICJ decided on November 26,
1984, it had "jurisdiction to entertain the case brought by Nicaragua
against the United States ... charging the United States with violations of
international law through use of military force."' 14 1 The ICJ decided that
reciprocity was a jurisdictional requirement under Article 36, paragraph 2,
and applied to declarations made without reservations of reciprocity. 14 2
The ICJ rejected the United States' argument, saying that the legal conse-
quence of the condition of reciprocity was that the parties were placed on
an equal footing, and identically phrased declarations were not
required. 143
Inevitably, there was talk of modifying the United States' obligation
following this decision by the ICJ. In considering possible modification,
Anthony D'Amato cautioned against restrictions that were too broad and
pointed out:
A declaration accepting the World Court's compulsory jurisdiction is as
much an offensive weapon against the legal delicts of other states as it is a
defensive weapon .... Because of the principle of reciprocity, any substan-
tive exception from compulsory justification will reduce opportunities to use
the [International] Court [of Justice] offensively against other states .... 144
D'Amato is pointing to the possibility of role reversal, and repeated interac-
tions-a situation where reciprocity constraints are effective in inducing
cooperation. He lists a number of areas where international law has grown
from custom, including "boundaries of nations at land and at sea," "suc-
cession of . . . governments," "slavery," "diplomatic .. . privileges and
immunities," "validity of international treaties," and "enforcement of for-
eign judgments," among many others. 145 He continues:
The rules of international law.., were not imposed on states from on high,
but rather grew out of their interactions over centuries of practice and
became established as customary international law. Thus the rules, almost
by definition, are the most efficient possible rules for avoiding international
friction and for accommodating the collective self-interest of all states. 14 6
A basic principle of customary law, as discussed above, is reciprocity.
Further, the Vienna Convention imposes reciprocity on all international
law created by treaty. 14 7 The Draft Declaration demonstrates that genera-
lized principles of international law do the same. 148 Therefore, reciprocity
140. See Briggs, supra note 138, at 377.
141. See id. at 373.
142. See id. at 376.
143. See id. at 378.
144. D'Amato, supra note 139, at 386.
145. Id. at 401.
146. Id. at 402.
147. Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 21(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. at 337.
148. See Draft Declaration, supra note 119.
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remains a key meta-rule in maintaining a reasonably well-functioning sys-
tem of international law. 149
Conclusion
This paper examined the role of reciprocity in international law, which is a
system without overarching legal authority to enforce rules. Using a game
theoretic approach, this Article delineated several classes of games. Three
different types of reciprocity constraints were defined and applied to
problems identified. Reciprocity constraints can resolve many issues in
international law, but are not a panacea. However, given the nature of
international law, with a fairly small number of repeat players, low dis-
count rates and institutional memory, it is reasonable to consider whether
reciprocity can become an underlying principle of the international legal
system. This Article concludes there is some evidence for the hypothesis
that reciprocity is a meta-rule for the system of international law.
149. One aspect of customary law is its continuing evolution. Thus, it is plausible
that new norms develop over time. The case of India's nuclear tests in 1998 could also
be seen as a violation of a developing international norm. See supra Part III.D. Simi-
larly, the Hague conventions and other declarations have helped influence the formation
of humanitarian law. Opinio juris, in the form of verbal statements by government offi-
cials; the content of resolutions and declarations, and the consent of states to instru-
ments will clearly influence the development of this law. It is worth noting Meron has
an underlying belief that these customs will be reciprocal. See Meron, supra note 121.
This belief is shared by the panelists of the CTBTO with respect to nuclear testing,
regardless of whether the CTBT comes into force as a treaty. See Panel Report, supra note
112.

